

Small Party Success and Institutional Contexts: The Case of the Extreme Right in Western Europe

Elisabeth L. Carter

Department of Government

University of Manchester

Manchester M13 9PL, UK

elisabeth.carter@stud.man.ac.uk

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Annual Conference, Edinburgh, September 8-10 2000. I am grateful to all panel participants for their comments and feedback.

Small Party Success and Institutional Contexts: The Case of the Extreme Right in Western Europe

Small parties have experienced mixed fortunes at the polls in Western Europe over the last two decades. The French and the German Greens, for example, have fared increasingly well in elections since their foundations in the early 1980s, and with 6.8 and 6.7 percent of the vote respectively in the last national elections, they now find themselves in government. In Belgium, Agalev and Ecolo are also part of the ruling coalition, having both scored over 7 percent of the popular vote in 1999. By contrast, in Denmark, Norway and Britain, Green parties remain incapable of amassing more than a handful of votes and are limited to operating outside of the legislature. Right-wing extremist parties have also performed well at the polls in many West European countries. Before its split in 1998, the French Front National regularly won between 10 and 15 percent of the vote in national elections. Similarly, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale gained nearly 16 percent of the vote in 1996, and most notably, in Austria, Jörg Haider's Freiheitliche Partei won 27 percent of the votes in 1999. However, right-wing extremist parties in Britain, Greece, Spain and Portugal continue to be very marginal political forces.

There are many reasons why certain small parties in Western Europe have performed better at the polls than others. Different social cleavages, different patterns of party competition, different ideologies and different leadership styles are just some of the factors which help account for the varying electoral success of these small competitors. In addition, the institutional environment within which parties operate is assumed to be of importance in influencing how well parties perform in elections. After all, political parties do not exist in a vacuum. Instead they are

conditioned to a greater or lesser extent by the 'rules of the game' of the political system in which they compete.

This paper sets out to examine the influence of one principal set of rules – namely the electoral system. Although this is by no means the only institutional arrangement deemed to have any impact on the electoral success of small parties, it is the set of rules which is considered to be most important for small party success.¹ Indeed, in one of the very few comparative studies on small parties, Peter Mair argues that the electoral system is 'the most obvious factor of relevance in any discussion of the preconditions of small party success' (1991: 54).

Rather than focusing on all small parties in Western Europe, this paper concentrates solely on the parties of the extreme right. The main reason for this is that this work is part of a wider research project on the West European extreme right, and the data on the right-wing extremist parties are therefore readily available. Equivalent data on other small parties have yet to be collected. Appendix 1 indicates which parties are included in this study. As well as full names and abbreviations, it reports the electoral scores for all the parties under observation in the period 1979-1999.

The time period 1979-1999 has been chosen because it represents the so-called 'third wave' of right-wing extremism. After the neo-fascism of the immediate post-war period and the 'new waves of social deprivation' of the 1960s and 1970s, right-wing extremist parties have

¹ Other electoral rules worthy of consideration include those which govern ballot access and media access and those which regard qualification for state subventions. Since these regulations affect the ability of parties to run effective electoral campaigns and attract voters, they may also potentially help account for the varying electoral results of small parties across Western Europe. In addition, three other institutional arrangements may also influence the electoral results of small parties. These are party laws, the level of territorial decentralization, and the impact of presidentialism. Further work will consider these dimensions.

experienced a resurgence in many West European countries in the last two decades (von Beyme, 1988). 1979 was chosen as a start date because the great majority of countries under observation held national elections in that year. Each party's result at each national election in this period forms one unit of analysis.²

Electoral systems and their influence on small parties

Since Maurice Duverger's seminal book Political Parties (1954), electoral systems have been commonly assumed to affect not only the size of parties' representation in parliament, but have also been seen to influence the vote shares parties receive at the polls. This is because the way in which votes are translated into seats (i.e. the mechanical effect of the electoral system) induces a psychological effect on both voters and party elites. This psychological effect comes into being when voters realize that, due to the mechanical workings of the electoral system, small parties may be underrepresented. A vote for a small party may thus become a wasted one and, rather than support this small party, voters may choose instead to favour the least unacceptable of the larger parties. In addition, party leaders may anticipate the mechanical workings of the electoral system and may decide not to compete in certain elections where representation cannot be guaranteed (Duverger, 1954; Blais and Carty, 1991: 80-1).

In view of the relationship between the mechanical and the psychological effects of electoral systems, it is reasonable to predict that the stronger the mechanical effect of the electoral system, the stronger its psychological effect on both voters and party elites. In other words, the more a system favours larger parties and discriminates against smaller ones, the more likely it will be that voters will choose to favour a larger party rather than waste their votes on the smaller

² Rae (1967), Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Cox (1997) and Katz (1997) all treat each election as a unit of analysis – although Katz also calculates a weighted N (1997: 122). In contrast, Lijphart's cases are electoral systems, 'defined as sets of essentially unchanged election rules under which one or more successive elections are conducted. Elections held under the same electoral system are regarded as repeated observations' (1994: 7).

competitor. Therefore, a strong mechanical effect may, in theory, lead to small parties experiencing low electoral scores.

The first step in testing this theory, and in investigating whether the disparity in the success of small parties may be explained by the presence of different electoral systems, is to measure the strength of the mechanical effect. This can be done quite easily by calculating the deviation of the seat shares of the parties from their vote shares. Various measures of this deviation - otherwise known as the disproportionality of the electoral system - exist, but perhaps the most favoured disproportionality index is the Gallagher index (1991).³ High values on this index indicate strong mechanical effects, with larger parties winning a greater percentage of the seats than they did of the vote, and with smaller parties obtaining a smaller share of the seats compared to their share of votes. Appendix 2 reports the disproportionality score of every national election in Western Europe in the period 1979-1999.

If strong mechanical effects lead to small parties experiencing low electoral scores, as has just been suggested, the relationship between the disproportionality measure of an electoral system and the score of the parties of the extreme right should be a negative one. In other words, the

³ The Gallagher (least-squares) index is calculated by taking the vote-seat share differences for each party, squaring them and then adding them. This total is then divided by 2. Finally the square root of this value is taken as the measure of disproportionality (see Gallagher, 1991). Other measures of disproportionality include the Rae index (1967) which sums the absolute differences between the vote percentages and the seat percentages, and then divides by the number of parties. This measure has come in for criticism however, as it is overly sensitive to the presence of very small parties, and therefore understates the disproportionality of systems which contain small competitors. Another index is the Loosemore-Hanby index (1971). Here, the absolute values of all vote-seat share differences are added as was the case in the Rae index, but then divided by 2 (rather than divided by the number of parties). Whilst the Loosemore-Hanby index avoids the problems which beset the Rae index, it too has its own drawbacks. Most notably, it tends to exaggerate the disproportionality of systems which contain large numbers of parties, and therefore overstates the disproportionality of proportional representation (PR) systems. The advantage of the Gallagher index is that it strikes a balance between the Rae index and the Loosemore-Hanby index. For a discussion of the various indices see Lijphart 1994: 58-67.

more disproportional an electoral system, the lower the electoral scores of the parties of the extreme right should be.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

However, as Table 1 illustrates, the disproportionality of electoral systems and the scores of right-wing extremist parties are not strongly (negatively) correlated, as was expected. In fact, the correlation coefficients in Table 1 are all actually positive. If all electoral systems are considered together, the correlation coefficient between the disproportionality of electoral system and the scores of the parties of the extreme right is .027. If proportional representation (PR) systems are considered on their own, the correlation coefficient is .007. High disproportionality therefore does not appear to translate into low electoral scores for parties of the extreme right, implying that the disproportionality of electoral systems does not contribute to explaining the disparity in the success of West European right-wing extremist parties at the polls.

Since it is widely recognized that '[T]he disproportionality characteristic of all electoral systems tends to favour the larger parties and to discriminate against the smaller ones', this result is somewhat surprising (Lijphart, 1988: 165). It also contradicts the findings in Mair's study of small parties. He uncovers a much stronger relationship between disproportionality and the small party vote (with a correlation coefficient of $-.283$) and thus concludes that 'the greater the disproportionality of the electoral system [...], the lower will be the small party share of the vote' (1991: 54).⁴

⁴ Mair's study differs from this one in that he includes all small parties in Western Europe in the postwar period (up to 1990). This does not mean he has more cases, however, because rather than using the small party vote at each national election as units of analysis, he employs the mean small party vote in one of two election phases (1947-1966 and 1967-1987). When he excludes two deviant cases (Austria 1967-1987 and West Germany 1967-1987) and the two majoritarian systems which have very high disproportionality values (France 1947-1966 and 1967-1987, and the UK 1967-1987), he arrives at even stronger negative correlations ($-.423$ and $-.572$). For more details see Mair, 1991: 54-55.

In view of the puzzling nature of this result, it is worth considering the impact of electoral systems in more detail. After all, disproportionality is only a consequence of an electoral system, rather than a dimension of a system per se. The two main dimensions of electoral systems which have consequences for the proportionality of the electoral outcome, and which therefore make up the greater part of the disproportionality score, are i) the electoral formula and ii) the district magnitude. These dimensions, and their influence on the right-wing extremist party vote will now be considered in turn.⁵

Electoral formulae

The formula of an electoral system refers to the method used to translate votes into seats. Two main types of electoral formula exist: majoritarian formulae and proportional formulae, and within each of these categories, a number of subgroups can be found.⁶

Majoritarian electoral formulae allocate seats in such a fashion that ‘the winner takes all’. The primary concern here is for the stability of the political system rather than for the proportionality with which votes are translated into seats. By promoting a clear winner, the aim of majoritarian formulae is to discourage multipartism and thus to favour the construction of parliamentary majorities (Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1967). Of the 14 countries under observation in this study only France (with the notable exception of 1986) and Britain employ majoritarian formulae. In Britain

⁵ The district magnitude of an electoral system is judged to have a greater impact on the proportionality of the electoral outcome than the electoral formula – at least when majoritarian and PR systems are considered separately (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 112; Lijphart, 1994: 98-100; Katz, 1997: 137-8). However, for ease of explanation, the effect of electoral formula will be examined first.

⁶ A number of authors distinguish between three types of formula rather than two. For example, Lijphart identifies semi-proportional formulae as well as majoritarian ones and proportional ones (1994: 10). This is simply a question of preference however, and it reflects the many different approaches to the classification of electoral systems. For a review of different classifications see Blais, 1988 and 1991.

the plurality formula is used and candidates must simply win the largest share of the vote in order to gain parliamentary representation. By contrast, in France the double-ballot majority-plurality formula is employed. Here candidates may be elected after a first round of voting if they have gained an absolute majority of the votes cast. If, as is usually the case, no candidate secures such a majority in the first round, a second round of voting takes place.⁷ At this stage a candidate may win representation with a simple plurality of the vote.

The majority of countries under observation in this study do not use majoritarian electoral formulae however. Instead, they employ proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and thus use formulae which distribute seats in proportion to the votes cast for individual parties or candidates. In the countries under observation, two main types of proportional formula exist: highest average formulae, and largest remainder formulae.⁸

Highest average formulae allocate seats to parties by dividing their votes by a series of divisors. At each stage of the process the party with the highest average vote is awarded a seat, and the process continues until all the seats have been filled. The d'Hondt formula, the Sainte-Laguë formula and the modified Sainte-Laguë formula are all examples of highest average formulae.⁹

⁷ In order to proceed to the second round a candidate must win a share of the vote equivalent to 12.5 percent of the electorate (rather than simply 12.5 percent of all valid votes) on the first ballot. In practice, the second round of French legislative elections is usually contested between two candidates only, although in recent years there has been a growing number of triangulaires, where three candidates have progressed to the second ballot.

⁸ A third electoral formula, the single transferable vote (STV) is not discussed in this paper because Ireland (which uses STV) is not one of the countries under observation. This is because it has no extreme right-wing political party.

⁹ Under the d'Hondt formula, the votes of the parties are first divided by 1, and the party with the highest average vote is awarded a seat. The process continues with the divisors 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 etc. until all the seats have been filled. Under the Sainte-Laguë formula the divisors 1, 3, 5, 7 etc. are used. This electoral formula is no longer employed in Europe, however, as the Scandinavian countries chose to replace it with the modified version (which uses the divisors 1.4, 3, 5, 7 etc.) on the grounds that the pure variant was too accommodating to small parties. The raising of the first divisor from 1 to 1.4 now makes it harder for small competitors to win their first seat, and hence renders the system less proportional. For parties that

In contrast, largest remainder formulae employ electoral quotas to allocate seats. Parties are given as many seats as they win quotas and any remaining seats are awarded to parties with the largest remainder of votes. The most common quota is the Hare quota which is calculated by dividing the number of valid votes by the district magnitude (explained below). Two alternatives are the Droop quota, in which the number of valid votes is divided by the district magnitude plus one, and the Imperiali quota, in which the number of valid votes is divided by the district magnitude plus two.

In addition to these formulae, one more electoral formula is relevant to this study. This is the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula. This system combines the highest average method with a quota. All parties are first awarded seats according to the Droop quota, and then the number of seats already won plus one is used as the divisor (Farrell, 1997: 85; Lijphart, 1994: 192). Table 2 illustrates which electoral formulae are used in which countries.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

In the simplest cases of PR, the country is divided into a number of constituencies or districts and these districts each elect a number of representatives to the legislature. This straightforward system is known as single-tier districting and is currently in operation in the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland. In the 1986 French legislative election, single-tier districting was also employed, with each département making up an electoral district. Norway also used this system up to and including the 1985 parliamentary election.

have already won their first seat the pure version and the modified version of this formula operate identically (Lijphart, 1994: 23 and 181).

In the majority of PR counties, however, a multi-tiered districting system is used. Here a certain number of seats are allocated at a higher tier, such as the region or the country as a whole. All votes that are not needed for seat allocation at the lower tier are pooled and used to determine the seats allocated at the higher tier. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway (since 1989) and Sweden all use this system and have two different districting tiers. Austria (since 1994), by contrast, has a districting system which incorporates three tiers.¹⁰

A notable feature of multi-tier districting is that different electoral formulae may be used for the allocation of seats at different tiers. Table 2 shows that this is the case in many of the countries under observation in this study. When different formulae are employed at the different tiers, it becomes important to determine which formula is the decisive one for the proportionality of the electoral outcome. Lijphart distinguishes between two types of two-tier methods: remainder-transfer systems and adjustment-seat systems. In the remainder-transfer systems all votes not needed in seat allocation at the lower tier are transferred to the higher district(s). It follows from this that, whatever the electoral formula used at the higher tier, large parties cannot be systematically favoured since the parties with the highest number of remaining votes are not necessarily the largest ones. Therefore, in remainder-transfer systems the formula used at the lower level is the decisive one so far as the proportionality of the electoral outcome is concerned (1994: 32).

In adjustment-seat systems, whilst seats are initially allocated in the lower level districts, the final allocation occurs at the higher tier and depends on all the votes cast in all of the lower tier districts which together make up the higher tier district. In adjustment-seat systems this higher

¹⁰ The country is first divided into 43 regional districts (the lower tier). Any votes not needed in the allocation of seats at this tier are pooled at the province level. The nine provinces or Länder of the country make up the second tier (the higher tier). Finally, any votes not used in seat allocations at the provincial level are pooled at the national level (the national tier).

tier thus becomes the crucial one as regards the proportionality of the electoral result (Lijphart, 1994: 32-6). Table 2 indicates which formula is the decisive one in multi-tiered electoral systems by the use of italics.¹¹

This detailed discussion of the different electoral formulae is of great importance because it has long been agreed in the literature on electoral systems that the formula affects the proportionality of the electoral outcome (Rae, 1967; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1994). In particular, majoritarian formulae give rise to much greater disproportionality than PR formulae as they tend to systematically favour larger parties. Small parties find it difficult to gain representation - unless their support is geographically concentrated - because they have little chance of winning the plurality or majority of the votes in an electoral district necessary to win a seat.

In light of this, it is reasonable to assume that right-wing extremist parties should perform less well under majoritarian formulae than under PR formulae. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, this has not been the case. When all types of electoral formula are considered together, there exists no clear relationship between the type of formula used and the electoral scores of the parties of the extreme right. Instead, whilst right-wing extremist parties have sometimes performed poorly under majoritarian formulae (like in Britain) as expected, they have also recorded low electoral scores in countries which employ PR formulae (as in Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). Equally, although these parties have sometimes fared well at the polls

¹¹ The Italian electoral system in operation since 1994 is a multi-tiered electoral system which uses the plurality formula at the lower tier and employs the LR-Hare formula at the upper tier. In the literature on electoral systems it is referred to as a 'mixed' system since it contains both majoritarian and PR elements. Classifying mixed electoral systems is a contentious issue because a judgement must be made as regards the relative weight of each element. In this study, this electoral system is included in the PR category of electoral systems, since it is the PR formula which operates at the decisive level. For further details on mixed electoral systems see Massicotte and Blais, 1999 and Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001.

under PR formulae (in Austria, France 1986, Italy and Norway for example), they have also experienced electoral success under majoritarian formulae (as in France).

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The absence of a relationship between the right-wing extremist party vote and the type of electoral formula is further illustrated if PR formulae are considered on their own. Although the differences are quite small, the various formulae can be ranked according to their proportionality. There is a broad consensus in the literature that the d'Hondt and the LR-Imperiali formulae are the least proportional PR formulae, that the modified Sainte-Laguë and the LR-Droop formulae form an intermediate category, and the LR-Hare formula is the most proportional PR formula (Lijphart, 1994: 24; Farrell, 1997: 145; Loosemore and Hanby, 1971; Rae, 1967). Since the results of the Hagenbach-Bischoff electoral formula are always identical to those of the d'Hondt formula, it can be included in the group of the least proportional PR formulae (Lijphart, 1994: 192).

From these rankings, it is reasonable to expect right-wing extremist parties to perform best in countries which employ the LR-Hare electoral formula, less well in countries which use the modified Sainte-Laguë formula or the LR-Droop formula, and least well of all in countries which employ the d'Hondt, the LR-Imperiali, or the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

However, as is illustrated in Table 3, no such pattern emerges. Although right-wing extremist parties have encountered electoral success in Italy where, in the period since 1994, the LR-Hare formula is used at the decisive tier, they have also performed well under the less proportional

d'Hondt formula, as in France in 1986.¹² Equally, certain parties of the extreme right have recorded low electoral scores in spite of competing under the most proportional type of PR formula. The German right-wing extremist parties, for example, have not fared well at the polls even though they have competed under the LR-Hare formula since 1987.

The absence of a relationship between the right-wing extremist party vote and the type of electoral formula suggests that formulae do not help explain why parties of the extreme right have performed better at the polls in certain countries than in others. However, it must be pointed out that this finding does not imply that formulae have no influence on the proportionality of the electoral outcome. After all, as was discussed above, it is well known that they do. Rather, the lack of a relationship suggests instead that formulae do not help explain the disparity in the electoral fortunes of right-wing extremist parties across Western Europe.

Even though electoral formulae do not help account for why certain right-wing extremist parties have performed better than others, it would be premature to conclude that electoral systems have no influence on the right-wing extremist party vote. The impact of dimensions other than formulae must also be examined before any conclusions about the explanatory power of electoral systems as a whole may be reached.

District magnitude and legal thresholds

The district magnitude of an electoral system refers to the number of representatives elected in a district. In majoritarian electoral systems, districts nearly always have a magnitude of 1 – i.e. each constituency elects one member of parliament.¹³ In contrast, PR systems have multi-

¹² See footnote 11 for details of the Italian electoral system.

¹³ In some cases, plurality and majority formulae are used in multi-member districts. For instance Thailand, Chile and South Korea employ the plurality formula in multi-member districts, whilst Mali uses the majority formula in multi-member districts. In these instances, the electoral outcome is even more

member districts, the magnitude of which varies in line with the district's population. More populous districts return more representatives to parliament than less populous ones.¹⁴

Like the electoral formula, the district magnitude of an electoral system affects the proportionality with which votes are converted into seats. In fact, when majoritarian and PR systems are considered separately, district magnitude is judged to be the most important determinant of proportionality. If all electoral systems are taken together, however, the electoral formula becomes more important than the district magnitude in determining the proportionality of the electoral outcome (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 112; Lijphart, 1994: 98-100; Katz, 1997: 137-8).

Under PR formulae, as the district magnitude increases so does the proportionality of the electoral outcome (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 112; Lijphart, 1994: 20 and 1999: 150-2; Katz, 1997: 134).¹⁵ Therefore, under PR, it is reasonable to expect parties of the extreme right to perform better where the district magnitude is high than where it is low, because in systems with high district magnitude a much smaller share of the vote is required to win a seat than in systems with low district magnitude. The increased chance of representation in systems with high district magnitude has a psychological impact on voters who appreciate that their vote might not be 'wasted' even though they are casting it in favour of a small party.

disproportional than in single-member districts (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 23). Interesting though they are, these cases clearly need not concern this study.

¹⁴ In some instances the district magnitude varies in line with the total electorate or the turnout rather than with the population. For example, in the German Land of Baden-Württemberg the district magnitude is determined by the turnout.

¹⁵ Under majoritarian formulae, as the district magnitude increases, the proportionality of the electoral outcome decreases – see footnote 13.

The district magnitude in some electoral systems may be so large however, that only a very small percentage of the vote would be required for a party to gain parliamentary representation. Since such situations are usually considered undesirable as they bring with them the danger of party system fragmentation and governmental instability, legal thresholds are often introduced so as to offset the effects of high district magnitude. Legal thresholds can take a number of forms. For example, parties may be required to win a minimum percentage of the vote (at either the district, regional or national level) to secure representation, or alternatively, they may need to win a certain number of seats in lower-level districts if they are to enter the legislature. The legal thresholds in operation in the countries under observation in this study are reported in Table 2.

Almost by definition, therefore, legal thresholds tend to modify the impact of district magnitude, and most often override it. Thus, when legal thresholds exist, the district magnitude no longer determines the share of the vote a party must win to gain representation. To take account of the impact of legal thresholds on district magnitude, Taagepera and Shugart calculate an 'effective magnitude' (1989: 135-41; 266-9), whilst Lijphart estimates an 'effective threshold' (1994: 25-30). Though different in nature, both approaches reflect the real constraints electoral systems impose on political parties.

This study will adopt Lijphart's approach and use effective thresholds as an indicator of the extent to which small parties are disadvantaged by the electoral system.¹⁶ The effective

¹⁶ Lijphart's effective threshold is favoured over Taagepera and Shugart's effective magnitude for two reasons. First, since the nature of the relationship between the district magnitude and the proportionality of the electoral outcome depends on the type of electoral formula employed (i.e. the fact that increases in district magnitude lead to lower levels of proportionality under majoritarian formulae but bring higher levels of proportionality under PR formulae), majoritarian and PR systems must be examined separately if the effective magnitude approach is adopted. However, if the effective threshold approach is used, both types of system may be analyzed together. Second, as Lijphart himself argues, since the effective threshold is expressed in terms of a percentage of the vote a party must win in order to gain representation, it is clearer and more meaningful than the effective magnitude in reflecting the constraints electoral systems impose on small parties (1994: 26 and 182).

threshold of an electoral system may either be clearly determined by the legal threshold (if such a threshold exists), or it may be inferred by the district magnitude. In the latter case, the average district magnitude is used and the effective threshold is calculated by taking the mean of the upper threshold (the vote share with which a party is guaranteed to win a seat) and the lower threshold (the minimum percentage with which it is possible for a party to gain representation).¹⁷

The effective thresholds of the electoral systems under observation in this study are reported in Table 2. At this stage it must be noted that the effective threshold of an electoral system, when inferred from the average district magnitude, is not a specific percentage of the vote but is a range of possibilities between the upper threshold and the lower threshold. This range is particularly apparent in majoritarian electoral systems where it is possible for a party to win a seat with as little as 20 percent of the vote if the rest of the votes are split evenly between the other competitors (Lijphart, 1994: 20).¹⁸ Despite its slightly imprecise nature, the effective threshold nonetheless remains a useful tool with which to assess the extent to which small parties are disadvantaged by the electoral system.

Since the influence of the district magnitude is reflected in the effective threshold, and since the district magnitude is considered a very important determinant of proportionality, it is reasonable to expect parties of the extreme right to perform better in systems with low effective thresholds,

¹⁷ In other words, the effective magnitude of an electoral system, when inferred from the average district magnitude is $(50/M+1)+(50/2M)$, where M is the average district magnitude. The average district magnitude is used because in systems with multi-member districts the district magnitude tends to vary from district to district. The average district magnitude is calculated by simply dividing the total number of seats in the legislature by the number of districts. For multi-tiered systems, the decisive district magnitude is found at the same tier as the decisive electoral formula. The average district magnitude at the lower level is therefore the decisive one in remainder-transfer systems, whilst it is the average district magnitude at the higher level which is the decisive one in adjustment-seat systems (Lijphart, 1994: 320). For further details on calculating effective thresholds see Lijphart, 1994: 26-30.

¹⁸ The upper threshold in majoritarian systems is 50 percent (plus one vote) since, with this score, even under the most unfavourable conditions, a party is guaranteed representation. However, because it is quite possible for a party to secure a seat with a much lower percentage of the vote than this, the effective threshold can be estimated to be nearer 35 percent. See Lijphart, 1994: 25-30.

than in systems where the effective threshold is high. The correlation between the right-wing extremist party vote and the effective threshold should therefore be a negative one.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

As Table 4 illustrates, a negative relationship between the right-wing extremist party vote and the effective threshold is indeed observed. When all electoral systems are taken together the correlation coefficient is $-.067$, and when PR systems are considered on their own the correlation coefficient is $-.124$. However, neither correlation is statistically significant, implying that it would be erroneous to suggest that the right-wing extremist party vote is influenced by the effective threshold of the electoral system. Instead, the conclusion must be reached that high district magnitudes and low legal thresholds (as represented by effective thresholds) do not appear to translate into high electoral scores for the parties of the extreme right.

Although this finding may appear somewhat surprising at first because the district magnitude is considered to have a very strong influence on the proportionality of the electoral outcome, it must be remembered that this study has already shown that right-wing extremist party success is not associated with the proportionality of the electoral outcome (as measured by the Gallagher index). The conclusion that the extreme right party vote is not significantly influenced by the district magnitude of the electoral system, and hence the finding that the disparity in the electoral success of the West European right-wing extremist parties cannot be explained by the presence of different district magnitudes and different legal thresholds, is therefore not unexpected.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that the disparity in the right-wing extremist vote across Western Europe cannot simply be explained by the presence of different electoral systems. In a series of

bivariate analyses, it has illustrated that neither the electoral formula nor the district magnitude of the different systems helps account for why certain West European right-wing extremist parties have performed better than others at the polls.

This represents a significant finding. Above all, it questions the strength of the psychological effect of electoral systems and it therefore challenges the 'conventional wisdom', often voiced in Anglo-American circles by PR critics, that proportional electoral systems allow extremist parties to break onto the political stage and to prosper. The paper suggests that, at the bivariate level at least, there is absolutely no evidence to support such claims. Whilst extremist parties have indeed experienced electoral success in proportional systems, it must not be forgotten they have also performed well at the polls in non-proportional systems.

The conclusions reached here are also of interest because they contradict the findings of one of the few existing comparative studies on small parties in which Mair maintains that 'a large proportion of the variance in the electoral support for small parties can be explained by reference to the relative degree of constraint imposed by the electoral system' (1991: 55). In contrast to Mair's work, the present paper finds no proof of such a relationship between the small party vote and the electoral system.

It must be remembered, however, that bivariate analyses, such as the correlations carried out in this paper (and those in Mair's study), may sometimes miss more subtle relationships between variables. If the influence of electoral systems on the small party vote is to be accurately assessed, future work must develop multivariate models in which independent variables, other than electoral system factors, are also included. For example, the prominence of certain social cleavages, the preponderance of certain value structures, and the different patterns of party competition are all factors which must to be taken into consideration, and controlled for, before


the true influence of electoral systems on the small party vote may be determined. The conclusions reached in this paper must therefore be treated with care and must be regarded as only preliminary. They have nonetheless challenged existing assumptions and have also pointed the way for future research.

References

- Betz, Hans-Georg and Stefan Immerfall (eds.) (1998), The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Beyme, Klaus von (1988), 'Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe', West European Politics, 11(2): 1-18.
- Blais, André (1988), 'The Classification of Electoral Systems', European Journal of Political Research, 16: 99-110.
- Blais, André (1991), 'The Debate over Electoral Systems', International Political Science Review, 12: 239-60.
- Blais, André and R. K. Carty (1991), 'The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor', British Journal of Political Science, 21: 79-93.
- Cheles, Luciano, Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan (eds.) (1991), Neo-Fascism in Europe, Longman: London.
- Cheles, Luciano, Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan (eds.) (1995), The Far-Right in Western and Eastern Europe, 2nd Edition, Longman: London.
- Cox, Gary W. (1997), Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Duverger, Maurice (1954), Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, London: Methuen.
- Elections Around the World: <http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/election.htm>
- Farrell, David M. (1997), Comparing Electoral Systems, Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Gallagher, Michael (1991), 'Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems', Electoral Studies, 10(1): 33-51.
- Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver and Peter Mair (eds.) (1995), Representative Government in Modern Europe, 2nd Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Hainsworth, Paul (ed.) (1992), The Extreme Right in Post-War Europe and the USA, London: Routledge.
- Hainsworth, Paul (ed.) (2000), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream, London: Pinter.
- Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database: <http://www.ipu.org/parline~e/parlinesearch.asp>
- Katz, Richard S. (1997), Democracy and Elections, New York: Oxford University Press.

- LeDuc, Lawrence, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds.) (1996), Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Lijphart, Arendt (1988), Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, Arendt (1994), Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, Arendt (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart Election Archive: <http://www.dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij/>
- Loosemore, John and Victor J. Hanby (1971), 'The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion: Some Analytic Expressions for Electoral Systems', British Journal of Political Science, 1: 467-77.
- Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose (1991), The International Almanac of Electoral History, 3rd Edition, London: Macmillan.
- Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose (1997), A Decade of Election Results: Updating the International Almanac, Glasgow: University of Strathclyde: Centre for the Study of Public Policy.
- Mair, Peter (1991), 'The Electoral Universe of Small Parties in Postwar Western Europe', in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives, pp. 41-70, London: Sage.
- Massicotte, Louis and André Blais (1999), 'Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical Survey', Electoral Studies, 18(3): 341-66.
- Parties and Elections in Europe: <http://www-public.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de/~nordsiew/indexe.htm/>
- Rae, Douglas W. (1967), The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.) (2001), Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Taagepera, Rein and Mathew Soberg Shugart (1989), Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Figure 1: Electoral formula and mean votes for extreme right parties in the period 1979-1999



Notes:

The mean vote is calculated as follows: the vote share obtained by all right-wing extremist parties in a given country for each election is summed. This total is then divided by the number of elections.

In the case of multi-tiered electoral systems the graph reports the formula used at the decisive tier. In remainder-transfer systems this is the formula used at the lower tier, whilst in adjustment-seat systems this is the formula used at the higher tier (see also Table 2).

Sources: electoral returns (see Appendix 1)

Table 1: Electoral system disproportionality and the electoral scores of right-wing extremist parties, 1979-1999: correlation coefficients

Disproportionality			
	All systems (93)	PR systems only (84)	Majoritarian systems only (9)
Electoral scores	.027	.007	.412

Notes:

Disproportionality as measured by the Gallagher index.

The Italian electoral systems of 1994 and 1996 are included in the PR category.

Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of cases.

Sources: as Appendices 1 and 2.

Table 2: Dimensions of electoral systems in Western Europe (1979-1999)

Country	Date	Tier Formula ¹	Average District Magnitude ²	Number of Districts	Assembly Size	Legal Threshold ³	Effective Threshold ⁴ (%)																																																																																																																																																																															
Austria	1979-1990	H d'Hondt	91.50	2	183	1 const seat	2.6 ^a																																																																																																																																																																															
		L LR-Hare	20.33	9					1994-1999	N d'Hondt	183	1	183	1 const seat or 4% (N)	4	H d'Hondt	20.33	9	L LR-Hare	4.26	43	Belgium	1981-1991	H H-B	23.56	9	212	0.66 of a Hare quota	4.8 ^a	L LR-Hare	7.07	30		1995-1999	H H-B	15.00	10	150	0.33 of a Hare quota		L LR-Hare	7.50	20	Denmark	1979-1998	H LR-Hare	179	1	179	SR ^c	2	L MSL	7.32 ^b	19	France	1981	Maj-Plur	1	474	474	-	35*	1986	d'Hondt	5.79	96	556	5% (D)	11.7	1988	Maj-Plur	1	555	555	-	35*	1993	Maj-Plur	1	571	571	-	35*	1997	Maj-Plur	1	577	577	-	35*	Germany	1980-1983	H d'Hondt	496	1	496 ^d	5% (N) or 3 const seats	5	L Plurality	1	248	1987	H LR-Hare	496	1	496 ^d	5% (N) or 3 const seats	5		1990-1998	H LR-Hare	656	1	656 ^d	5% (N) or 3 const seats	5	L Plurality	1	328	Greece ^e	1981	S LR-Hare	12	1	12	17 (N)	17	H d'Hondt*	18	1	18	17 (N)	17	M d'Hondt*	4.22	9	38	17 (N)	17	L d'Hondt*	4.14	56	232	-	15.8	weighted mean		d'Hondt*	5.30		184.77		16.1		1985	S d'Hondt	12	1	12	-	5.9	H d'Hondt*	18	1	18	-	4.0	M d'Hondt*	4.22	9	38	-	15.5	L d'Hondt*	4.14	56	232	-	15.8	weighted mean		d'Hondt*
	1994-1999	N d'Hondt	183	1	183	1 const seat or 4% (N)	4																																																																																																																																																																															
		H d'Hondt	20.33	9																																																																																																																																																																																		
		L LR-Hare	4.26	43																																																																																																																																																																																		
Belgium	1981-1991	H H-B	23.56	9	212	0.66 of a Hare quota	4.8 ^a																																																																																																																																																																															
		L LR-Hare	7.07	30					1995-1999	H H-B	15.00	10	150	0.33 of a Hare quota		L LR-Hare	7.50	20	Denmark	1979-1998	H LR-Hare	179	1	179	SR ^c	2	L MSL	7.32 ^b	19	France	1981	Maj-Plur	1	474	474	-	35*	1986	d'Hondt	5.79	96	556	5% (D)	11.7	1988	Maj-Plur	1	555	555	-	35*	1993	Maj-Plur	1	571	571	-	35*	1997	Maj-Plur	1	577	577	-	35*	Germany	1980-1983	H d'Hondt	496	1	496 ^d	5% (N) or 3 const seats	5	L Plurality	1	248	1987	H LR-Hare	496	1	496 ^d	5% (N) or 3 const seats	5		1990-1998	H LR-Hare	656	1	656 ^d	5% (N) or 3 const seats	5	L Plurality	1	328	Greece ^e	1981	S LR-Hare	12	1	12	17 (N)	17	H d'Hondt*	18	1	18	17 (N)	17	M d'Hondt*	4.22	9	38	17 (N)	17	L d'Hondt*	4.14	56	232	-	15.8	weighted mean		d'Hondt*	5.30		184.77		16.1		1985	S d'Hondt	12	1	12	-	5.9	H d'Hondt*	18	1	18	-	4.0	M d'Hondt*	4.22	9	38	-	15.5	L d'Hondt*	4.14	56	232	-	15.8	weighted mean		d'Hondt*	5.30		184.77		14.7																				
	1995-1999	H H-B	15.00	10	150	0.33 of a Hare quota																																																																																																																																																																																
		L LR-Hare	7.50	20																																																																																																																																																																																		
Denmark	1979-1998	H LR-Hare	179	1	179	SR ^c	2																																																																																																																																																																															
		L MSL	7.32 ^b	19																																																																																																																																																																																		
France	1981	Maj-Plur	1	474	474	-	35*																																																																																																																																																																															
	1986	d'Hondt	5.79	96	556	5% (D)	11.7																																																																																																																																																																															
	1988	Maj-Plur	1	555	555	-	35*																																																																																																																																																																															
	1993	Maj-Plur	1	571	571	-	35*																																																																																																																																																																															
	1997	Maj-Plur	1	577	577	-	35*																																																																																																																																																																															
Germany	1980-1983	H d'Hondt	496	1	496 ^d	5% (N) or 3 const seats	5																																																																																																																																																																															
		L Plurality	1	248																																																																																																																																																																																		
	1987	H LR-Hare	496	1	496 ^d	5% (N) or 3 const seats	5																																																																																																																																																																															
	1990-1998	H LR-Hare	656	1	656 ^d	5% (N) or 3 const seats	5																																																																																																																																																																															
		L Plurality	1	328																																																																																																																																																																																		
Greece ^e	1981	S LR-Hare	12	1	12	17 (N)	17																																																																																																																																																																															
		H d'Hondt*	18	1	18	17 (N)	17																																																																																																																																																																															
		M d'Hondt*	4.22	9	38	17 (N)	17																																																																																																																																																																															
		L d'Hondt*	4.14	56	232	-	15.8																																																																																																																																																																															
weighted mean		d'Hondt*	5.30		184.77		16.1																																																																																																																																																																															
	1985	S d'Hondt	12	1	12	-	5.9																																																																																																																																																																															
		H d'Hondt*	18	1	18	-	4.0																																																																																																																																																																															
		M d'Hondt*	4.22	9	38	-	15.5																																																																																																																																																																															
		L d'Hondt*	4.14	56	232	-	15.8																																																																																																																																																																															
weighted mean		d'Hondt*	5.30		184.77		14.7																																																																																																																																																																															



Table 2 (cont.)

Country	Date	Tier Formula ¹	Average District Magnitude ²	Number of Districts	Assembly Size	Legal Threshold ³	Effective Threshold ⁴ (%)
Greece (cont.)	1989-1990	S d'Hondt	12	1	12	-	3.3
		H LR-Hare	22.15	13	}288	-	
		L LR-Droop	5.14	56		-	
	1993-1996	S d'Hondt	12	1	12	3	
		H d'Hondt*		1		3	
		M LR-Hare		13	}288	3	
L d'Hondt*			56	3			
Italy	1979-1992	H LR-Hare	630	1	630	1 const seat and 300,000 votes	2.0 ^f
		L LR-Imp	19.69	32			
	1994-1996	H LR-Hare	155	1	630	4% (N) for higher tier alloc only	4
		L Plurality	1	475			
Neths	1981-1998	d'Hondt	150	1	150	0.67% (N)	0.67
Norway	1981	MSL	7.75	20	155	-	8.9
	1985	MSL	7.85	20	157	-	8.8
	1989-1997	H MSL	165	1	165	4% (N)	4
	L MSL	8.26 ^g	19				
Portugal	1979-1987	d'Hondt	12.50	20	250	-	5.7
	1991-1999	d'Hondt	11.50	20	230	-	6.2
Spain	1979-1996	d'Hondt	6.73	52	350	3% (D)	10.2
Sweden	1979-1998	H MSL	349	1	349	4% (N) ⁱ 4% (N) or 12% in one const	4
		L MSL	11.07 ^h	28			
Switz.	1979-1999	H-B	7.69	26	200	-	9.0
UK	1979-1987	Plurality	1	650	650	-	35*
	1992	Plurality	1	651	651	-	35*
	1997	Plurality	1	659	659	-	35*

Table 2 (cont.)

Notes:

¹ In the case of multi-tiered electoral system, the table shows which tier is decisive by the use of italics. In remainder-transfer systems this is the formula at the lower tier, whilst in adjustment-seat systems this is the formula used at the higher tier.

² The average district magnitude is calculated by dividing the number of seats in the legislature by the number of districts.

³ N denotes a legal threshold imposed at the national level; D refers to a legal threshold applied at the district level.

⁴ The effective threshold is either determined by the legal threshold of the electoral system, or is inferred by the district magnitude, whichever value is higher. If inferred by the district magnitude, the effective threshold is calculated by taking the mean of the upper threshold and the lower threshold.

LR-Hare: largest remainder Hare formula

H-B: Hagenbach-Bischoff formula

MSL: modified Sainte-Laguë formula

Maj-Plur : Majority-Plurality 2-ballot formula

LR-Droop: largest remainder Droop formula

LR-Imp : largest remainder Imperiali formula

^a see Lijphart, 1994: 38-9.

^b In Denmark only 139 seats are distributed among the constituencies.

^c Special rules: to receive seats at the higher level Danish parties must either i) have won at least one constituency seat, ii) have obtained at least as many votes as on average were cast per constituency in at least two of the three regions, or iii) have obtained at least 2% of all valid votes in the country as a whole.

* approximation

^d not including *Überhangmandaten*

^e The Greek electoral system is extremely complex, and takes the form of four separate and parallel elections to four mini-assemblies. Although the electoral formula employed in the period 1981-1990 is the LR-Hare formula, this actually operates like the d'Hondt formula. For further details on the Greek electoral systems see Lijphart, 1994: 38.

^f see Lijphart, 1994: 38.

^g In Norway only 157 seats are distributed among the constituencies.

^h In Sweden only 310 seats are distributed among the constituencies.

ⁱ Swedish parties that have obtained seats at the lower level through the 12% rule only are excluded from representation at the higher tier.

Sources: Lijphart, 1994; Gallagher et al., 1995; Le Duc et al., 1996 ; Lijphart Election Archive ; IPU Parline Database.

Table 3: Electoral formulae and the mean right-wing extremist party vote (1979-1999)

Country	Period	Number of elections	Formula ^a	Mean right-wing extremist vote (%)
Italy	1994-1996	2	LR-Hare	23.9
Austria	1979-1999	7	LR-Hare	15.5
Denmark	1979-1998	8	LR-Hare	6.6
Germany	1987-1998	4	LR-Hare	2.1
Norway	1981-1997	5	MSL	8.6
Sweden	1979-1998	7	MSL	4.3
France	1986	1	d'Hondt	9.8
Italy	1979-1992	4	LR-Imperiali	8.4
Belgium	1981-1999	6	H-B	5.6
Switzerland	1979-1999	6	H-B	5.0
Spain	1979-1996	6	d'Hondt	1.3
Netherlands	1981-1998	6	d'Hondt	1.0
Portugal	1979-1999	8	d'Hondt	0.7
Germany	1980-1983	2	d'Hondt	0.2
France	1981 and 1988-1997	4	Majority-Plurality	9.4
UK	1979-1997	5	Plurality	0.2

Notes:

The cases are ranked from most to least proportional electoral formula.

^a In the case of multi-tiered electoral systems the table reports the formula used at the decisive tier. In remainder-transfer systems this is the formula used at the lower tier, whilst in adjustment-seat systems this is the formula used at the higher tier (see also Table 2).

LR-Hare: largest remainder Hare formula

LR-Imperiali: largest remainder Imperiali formula

MSL: modified Sainte-Laguë formula

H-B: Hagenbach-Bischoff formula

Sources: as Appendix 1

Table 4: Effective thresholds and the electoral scores of right-wing extremist parties, 1979-1999: correlation coefficients

Effective threshold			
	All systems (81)	PR systems only (72)	Majoritarian systems only (9)
Electoral scores	-.067	-.124	n/a

Notes:

The effective threshold is either determined by the legal threshold of the electoral system or is inferred by the district magnitude, whichever value is higher. If inferred by the district magnitude, the effective threshold is calculated by taking the mean of the upper threshold and the lower threshold.

The Italian electoral systems of 1994 and 1996 are included in the PR category.

n/a: the correlation between effective threshold and the electoral scores of right-wing extremist parties in majoritarian systems cannot be computed because the effective threshold in these systems is constant (i.e. the effective threshold in all majoritarian cases is 35 percent as the district magnitude is always 1). Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of cases.

Sources: as Appendices 1 and 2.

APPENDIX 1: Right-wing extremist parties in Western Europe (1979-1999)

Table A1: Party Names

Country	Party	Full Name	English Translation
Austria	FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party of Austria
Belgium	VB FNb	Vlaams Blok Front National / Front voor die Natie	Flemish Bloc National Front
Denmark	FRPd DF	Fremskridtspartiet Dansk Folkeparti	Progress Party Danish People's Party
France	FN MNR	Front National Mouvement National Républicain	National Front National Republican Movement
Germany	Republikaner DVU NPD	Die Republikaner Deutsche Volksunion Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	The Republicans German People's Union National Democratic Party of Germany
Greece	PK EPEN ENEK EK	Komma Proodeftikon Ethniki Politiki Enosis Enomeno Ethniko Kinema Ethniko Komma	Progress Party National Political Union United Nationalist Movement National Party
Italy	MSI / AN Lega Nord	Movimento Sociale Italiano / Alleanza Nazionale Lega Nord	Italian Social Movement / National Alliance Northern League
Netherlands	CP / CP'86 CD	Centrumpartij / Centrumpartij'86 Centrumdemocraten	Centre Party / Centre Party '86 Centre Democrats
Norway	FRPn	Fremskrittspartiet	Progress Party
Portugal	PDC	Partido de Democracia Cristã	Christian Democratic Party
Spain	FNs FEJons	Fuerza Nueva / Frente Nacional Falanga Española de las JONS	New Force / National Front Spanish Falange
Sweden	ND	Ny Demokrati	New Democracy
Switzerland	NA / SD APS / FPS	Nationale Aktion für Volk und Heimat/ Schweizer Demokraten Autopartei der Schweiz / Freiheitspartei der Schweiz	National Action for People and Homeland / Swiss Democrats Car Party of Switzerland / Freedom Party of Switzerland
United Kingdom	NF BNP	National Front British National Party	- -

Table A2: Electoral scores of right-wing extremist parties (1979-1999)

		1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
FPO	Austria	6.1	17.0 [§]			5.0			1.2 [§] 9.7				16.6	
FNb	Belgium							X		X		X*		1.1
VB	Belgium	_*		1.1			1.3*	1.4		1.9		4.1*		6.6
FRPd	Denmark	11.0 5.8*		8.9			3.6 3.5*			4.8	9.0	5.3*	6.4	
DF	Denmark													
FN	France	-		0.2 - [§]			11.2*		9.8		9.8 14.4 [§]	11.7*		
Rep.	Germany					-	_*			-		7.1*	2.1	
DVU	Germany	_*	-			-	_*			0.6 ^b		1.6* [§]	X	
NPD	Germany	X*	0.2			0.2	0.8*			0.6 ^b		1.6* [§]	0.3	
KP/EPEN/ ENEK/EK	Greece			1.6 ^c 2.0* ^c			2.6* ^d	0.6 ^f				0.3 ^{ef} 1.5* ^d	0.1 ^g	
MSI/AN	Italy	5.3 5.4*				6.8	6.5*			5.9		5.3*		
LV/LL/LN	Italy					0.3 ^h	X*			1.3 ⁱ		1.8* ^j		
CP/CP86	Neths			0.1	0.8		2.5*		0.4			- _*		
CD	Neths								0.1			0.9 0.8*		
FRPn	Norway			4.5				3.7				13.0		
PDC	Portugal	1.1	0.4			0.7		0.7		0.6 X*		0.7*		-
FNs	Spain	2.1 ^k			0.5 ^k				-	0.6*		- 0.4*		
FEJons	Spain	2.1 ^k			0.5 ^k				0.2	X*		X 0.1*		
ND	Sweden													6.7
NA/SD	Switz	1.3 ^l				2.9				2.5				3.3
APS/FPS	Switz									2.6				5.1
BNP	UK					0.0	X*			- ^m		X*		
NF	UK	0.7				0.1	X*			- ⁿ		X*		

Table A2 cont: Electoral scores of right-wing extremist parties (1979-1999)

		1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
FPO	Austria			22.5 27.6*	21.9				26.9 23.5*
FNb	Belgium			2.9*	2.3				1.5 1.5*
VB	Belgium			7.8*	7.8				9.9 9.2*
FRPd	Denmark			6.4 2.9*				2.4	0.7*
DF	Denmark							7.4	5.8*
FN	France		12.7	10.5*	15.3 [§]		14.9		5.7* 3.3* ^a
Rep.	Germany			1.9 3.9*				1.8	1.7*
DVU	Germany			- -*				1.2	-*
NPD	Germany			0.3 0.2*				0.3	0.4
KP/EPEN/ ENEK/EK	Greece		0.1 ^g	0.8* ^g		0.2 ^g			X*
MSI/AN	Italy	5.4		13.5 12.5*		15.7			10.3*
LV/LL/LN	Italy	8.7		8.4 X*		10.1			4.5*
CP/CP86	Neths			0.4 -*				X	
CD	Neths			2.5 1.0*				0.6	X*
FRPn	Norway		6.3				15.3		
PDC	Portugal			-*	-				X*
FNs	Spain		-	-*					
FEJons	Spain		X	X*		X			X*
ND	Sweden			1.8	0.1*			1.2	X*
NA/SD	Switz				3.1				1.8
APS/FPS	Switz				4.0				0.9
BNP	UK	0.0		X*			0.1		1.0*
NF	UK	0.0		X*			0.0 ^p		X*

Notes:

Grey areas indicate that the party did not exist at this time.

X missing data

- party did not contest election

§ percentage of the vote won in the first round of the presidential election

* Euroelection

a Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) under the leadership of Mégret which split from the FN in 1998.

b from 1987 to 1990 the DVU and the NPD joined forces and contested elections under the banner DVU-Liste D

c Progress Party (Komma Proodeftikon, PK)

d National Political Union (Ethniki Politiki Enosis, EPEN) and United Nationalist Movement (Enomeno Ethniko Kinema, ENEK)

e election of 18 June 1989

f EPEN

g EPEN and the National Party (Ethniko Komma, EK)

h Venetian League only - Lombard League did not stand

i scores of Lombard League and Venetian League

j Lombard League only

k Fuerza Nueva and FE de las JONS formed a coalition under the banner of the National Union (Union Nacional)

l Nationale Aktion joined forces in the 1979 election with the Schweizerische Republikanische Bewegung.

m in 1987 two unofficial candidates stood for the BNP

n in 1987 one unofficial candidate stood for the NF

p the National Front split in the summer of 1995. The largest faction went on to call itself the National Democrats, and put up 21 candidates in the 1997 general election. What was left of the national Front put up 6 candidates in that election. Both factions recorded electoral scores of 0.0%.

Sources: electoral returns, Mackie and Rose, 1991 and 1997; Cheles et al., 1991 and 1995; Hainsworth, 1992 and 2000; Betz and Immerfall (1998); Elections around the World; Parties and Elections in Europe.

APPENDIX 2: Disproportionality of elections (1979-1999)**AUSTRIA**

1979	1983	1986	1990	1994	1995	1999
0.96	2.48	0.91	2.08	1.18	1.07	3.34

BELGIUM

1981	1985	1987	1991	1995	1999
4.16	3.19	3.24	3.57	3.00	3.06

DENMARK

1979	1981	1984	1987	1988	1990	1994	1998
1.53	1.53	1.40	2.13	2.35	2.61	1.52	0.32

FRANCE

1981	1986	1988	1993	1997
15.96	7.20	11.80	25.55	18.64

GERMANY

1980	1983	1987	1990	1994	1998
1.42	0.53	0.66	4.71	2.20	3.11

GREECE

1981	1985	1989J	1989N	1990	1993	1996
8.35	7.12	4.36	3.92	3.90	7.57	9.43

ITALY

1979	1983	1987	1992	1994	1996
2.64	2.59	2.48	2.49	9.69	5.92

NETHERLANDS

1981	1982	1986	1989	1994	1998
1.27	1.12	1.66	1.24	1.42	1.32

NORWAY

1981	1985	1989	1993	1997
4.92	4.74	3.65	3.95	3.71

PORTUGAL

1979	1980	1983	1985	1987	1991	1995	1999
3.99	4.12	2.94	3.74	6.27	6.04	4.58	4.96

SPAIN

1979	1982	1986	1991	1993	1996
10.59	8.08	6.72	9.19	7.05	5.56

SWEDEN

1979	1982	1985	1988	1991	1994	1998
1.28	2.43	1.34	2.41	2.87	1.56	0.94

SWITZERLAND

1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999
2.05	3.12	3.74	2.60	4.49	3.06

UNITED KINGDOM

1979	1983	1987	1992	1997
11.60	20.64	17.74	13.50	16.63

Notes:

Disproportionality scores calculated using the least-squares index (Gallagher, 1991). The vote-seat differences for each party are squared and then added. This total is then divided by two, and finally the square root of this value is taken as the disproportionality score.

The votes and seats of parties described by electoral returns as 'others' (i.e. very small parties) are not included in the calculations (see Lijphart, 1994: 61).

For Greece, 1989J denotes the election of 18 June 1989. 1989N refers to the election of 5 November 1989.

Source: electoral returns (as Appendix 1).